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experimental phenomenology and psychophysics are two rather different approaches 
to the study of perception, and rely on first-person descriptions and third-person 
measurements of the percept, respectively. yet, a common ground may be found in the 
original goal, shared by both approaches, of addressing the conscious dimension of 
perception. here we argue that, despite being objective and quantitatively-oriented, 
psychophysics can, with some cautions, recover certain simple subjective aspects of 
conscious perception. Building upon the results of a motion perception experiment, we 
show how to transform the ratings of subjective visibility into a well-known index of 
objective discriminability in perceptual decisions (d’). We found that, once all factors 
are equated, motion discrimination is superior to motion detection, as measured as 
perceptual decisions; in turn, motion detection is superior to subjective motion visibility. 
This finding strengthens our previous suggestion that, under uncertainty conditions, 
perceptual decisions can be taken before the conscious percept is fully stabilized, and 
suggests that some simple sensations can be reliably captured by objective “currency” 
through an open-minded quantitative approach. Our perspective may be regarded as an 
attempt to “phenomenologize psychophysics”.
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It is generally accepted that psychology as a scientific discipline originated 
in 1879, when Wilhelm Wundt founded the first laboratory of experimental 
psychology in leipzig. mental facts were thus thought to be explained by 
physical/physiological facts, and assumed to be amenable to experimental 
investigation, as in the physical/physiological sciences. these ideas were 
then exported in the United States by edward titchener, and became a 
main tenet of the mainstream scientific psychology. The reliance on the 
scientific method in psychology also heavily drew from a new discipline that 
had emerged just a few years earlier, also in germany: building upon the 
pioneering work of ernst Weber (1834), gustav theodor Fechner published 
in 1860 his elemente der Psychophysik, which established psychophysics as the 
quantitative branch of the study of perception and the “exact science” of the 
relation between sensory stimuli and the ensuing sensations (the so-called 
external psychophysics). at variance with Wundt’s methodology, which 
involved controlled introspection to characterize the subjective sensations of 
his subjects, psychophysics developed its own rigorous methods to measure 
sensations,1 introducing for example the notion of sensory thresholds. about 
one century after Fechner’s initial work, the application of Signal detection 
theory (Sdt), originally developed for telecommunications, brought an 
important evolution in psychophysics, shifting the focus on the capability to 
make a perceptual decision2 (e.g., deciding that a given signal, or stimulus, 
is present or absent). another important extension of psychophysics came 
with the introduction of the scaling methods, which assumed that subjects 
can produce reliable quantitative reports of their own subjective sensations 
(richardson, 1929; Stevens, 1946, 1957). in direct magnitude estimation, for 
example, subjects are asked to assign a numeral to a given sensory attribute 
along a continuum, or scale.
in the same period of Wundt, and again in germany, Franz brentano 
gave rise to another school of thought in psychology, grounded on 
phenomenology rather than on experimental science. brentano did not 
believe that psychophysics could really get a grasp on the structure of 
1  With the term “sensation” we do not mean the introspective reading of an internal event, 
nor just the processing of sensory information, but the humble conscious experience of an 
external stimulus. 
2  a perceptual decision is the result of choosing an option from a set of alternatives based on 
available sensory information. 
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conscious experience, which in his opinion should be demonstrated 
through direct experience rather than measured: “a clear  understanding 
of what is actually measured by Fechner’s methods would show us that the 
object of measurement is not so much a mental as a physical phenomenon” 
(brentano 1874/2009, 52). however, immediately thereafter brentano himself 
seems to leave room for the possibility of measuring mental facts through 
psychophysical methods, though only partially: “For my part, i admit that 
if, on the basis of Fechner’s method, a measurement could be found for the 
physical phenomenon, it could also be found for the mental phenomenon in 
which the physical phenomenon is presented. yet, it seems to me necessary 
to add the new restriction that only one aspect of the mental phenomenon 
should be measured according to its intensity, namely its reference to its 
primary object, for we shall see that the mental phenomenon has still other 
aspects and is not exhausted by this one reference” (p.52). the ideas of 
Brentano have been highly influential for edmund Husserl in philosophy, and 
carl Stumpf and alexius meinong in psychology. later on, the berlin school 
of the gestaltpsychologie (Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffka, max Wertheimer) 
sprouted from the phenomenological tradition. in italy, cesare musatti, Fabio 
metelli and gaetano Kanizsa, following vittorio benussi, contributed crucially 
to the diffusion of the phenomenological method in psychology. 
behind the substantial differences between the psychophysical and the 
phenomenological approach to the mental facts, they share the original 
aim of grasping the realm of subjective experience, at least in the domain of 
perception. as a matter of fact, Fechner embraced a view of the mind-body 
problem (“psychophysical parallelism”) that at least certified his genuine 
interest for the mind. While the primary concern for conscious perception 
remained obviously well alive in the phenomenological approach, also in 
its experimental variant (bozzi, 1989; vicario, 1993), it remained somewhat 
under the surface in the psychophysical approach, where observers were 
better regarded as “responding machines” (producing an observable behavior) 
rather than “contemplative spectators” (having a private sensation). indeed, 
perceptual decisions can be studied disregarding the phenomenal status of the 
observer.
the risk of throwing consciousness away is present also in cognitive 
neuroscience (with some notable exceptions, e.g., gallagher 2007; gallese 
2006; varela 1996). because neglecting the conscious mind cannot be 
adequately motivated by the need to reject metaphysical dualism, as this 
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would throw the baby out with the water (de’Sperati, 2006), consciousness 
must be taken seriously. however, if neuroscience aims to address the 
conscious mind, either it undergoes a Kuhnian revolution, or it cannot 
escape the traditional logic and methodology of experimental investigation, 
the same that has always been used for studying, say, movement and neural 
motor control. this in turn implies that appropriate methods to measure 
the conscious experience should be adopted, and this brings back to the 
target theme of this article. in this regard, we just note that the terminology 
is often loose or ambiguous, as, for example, studying visual perception is 
not tantamount to studying the conscious experience of seeing, although 
it clearly alludes to it. More generally, this is the difficult relation between 
consciousness and cognition. the ambiguity is certainly not dissipated 
by presenting physiological and neuroimaging methods as methods to 
measure the mind (Senior et al 2006). Somewhat ironically, the formulation 
“neural correlates of consciousness” (but, again, also “neural correlates of 
movement”) implies the existence of two terms. 
in this article we will not try to refute or favor one or the other approach, 
phenomenology or psychophysics, as this is probably an endless exercise.3 
We simply wish to underline some aspects that we hope may help 
appreciating the efforts that at least part of the scientific psychology 
community puts in the attempt to get close to the conscious, subjective 
experience, simple as it may be, without  throwing it away but rather 
taking it seriously (Overgaard, 2001). Although a defining property of the 
experimental method is the manipulation of the independent variable(s), 
we will deal with another important aspect of the scientific method, that 
is, the choice and the treatment of the dependent variable(s). in particular, 
we will focus on how to (try to) measure a conscious sensation in visual 
perception using the tools of psychophysics. For this, we will build upon a 
recent study on motion perception (gregori-grgic et al., 2011), as well as on 
some data of a new experiment in which various tasks and conditions are 
directly compared, which differ along the objective/subjective dimension 
(though this distinction is somewhat blurred in psychophysics, Kingdom & 
Pins 2010).
Briefly, we used noisy motion stimuli (RDK, Fig. 1A), which were presented 
3 in 1932, a committee appointed by the british association for the advancement of Science to 
answer the question whether human sensations could be measured, took seven years to discuss the 
issue and did not reach a general consensus (michell, 1999).
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for 200 ms to 18 observers. before running the main experiment, we selected 
the individual 75% coherence threshold, so to make motion difficult to 
discern. the “motion” stimuli were randomly alternated to the “noise” 
stimuli (coherence=0%). the observers had to tell whether the stimulus was 
motion (regardless of its direction) or noise by a key press (detection task). 
because there was only one stimulus in each trial, the above trial design is 
called 1-interval  (this kind of detection task is also called yes/no task). We 
used also another design, called 2-intervals, in which two subsequent stimuli 
are provided in each trial, either the pair rightward/leftward motion or the 
pair motion/noise. This time the observer had to tell in which interval (first/
second) was the motion or the noise stimulus (detection task, 2-int), or in 
which interval (first/second) was the rightward or the leftward stimulus 
(discrimination task, 2-Int). Because the dimension of the response (first or 
second) is independent of the stimulus content, this design is often considered 
to be more objective and unbiased as compared to the yes/no task. Finally, in 
another session observers had to judge the subjective visibility of motion, with 
the stimulus presented with a 1-interval design, as detailed below (detection 
task, 1-int rating). two aspects were crucial.
Firstly, in order to capture as much as possible the first-person, subjective 
visibility of motion (the conscious sensation), we used an absolute 5-points 
rating scale (“perceptual awareness scale”, overgaard et al., 2006). Subjective 
visibility is thus assumed to be a prothetic, rather than a metathetic 
continuum. the number of points was chosen to make the scale simple and 
comfortable for the observers, and the extremes of the scale were anchored 
to the minimum and maximum absolute values, namely, null visibility and 
full visibility. then, despite not strictly necessary (see below), we ensured 
that participants understood that the scale represented a linear quantity.4 
the instructions, which were given in both written and colloquial form, 
were the following:   0 = you didn’t see at all the motion direction; 1 = 
between 0 and 2: you had a raw feeling of the motion direction; 2 = half-way 
point of the scale: you probably saw the motion direction; 3 = between 2 and 
4: you saw the motion direction, but not too well; 4 = you saw clearly the 
motion direction.
Secondly, because it is important that the measures of sensation are 
expressed in a “currency” suitable to be directly compared with the 
4 another solution could have been to use a visual analog Scale, which is continuous. 
however, because of the properties of the roc curve, the same results would be expected.
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“objective” measures of perceptual decisions (reingold and merikle, 
1988), the visibility ratings were transformed into the so-called 
sensitivity index d’, which measures the discriminability of a signal in 
decision tasks (Wickens, 2002). brief ly (for details see gregori-grgic et al., 
2011), the rating task was treated as a multiple detection task: the scores 
greater than 0 were first  considered  to  be  ‘motion’  responses,  while  
the  0  score  was considered to be a ‘noise’ response; next, scores greater 
than 1 were considered to be ‘motion’ responses, while scores less than 
2 were   considered   to   be   ‘noise’   responses,   and   so   on,   until 
encompassing  all  pairs.  Following Sdt (Wickens, 2002), hits (‘motion’ | 
motion) and false alarms (‘motion’ | noise) were computed. the pattern 
of hits and false alarms allowed us to build a roc curve, from which d’ 
can be derived (area theorem). thus, a subjective judgment about motion 
visibility was transformed in a standard quantity (d’), which is a useful 
common “currency” in psychophysics and has a well-known metrics.
this second aspect is important not only because it provides an index 
with a common metrics, but also because it allows to avoid a thorny issue 
in psychology, namely, that of the scale of measure. clearly, it is always 
desirable that a measure preserves all the properties of the phenomenon 
it represents, as in physics, where measures are quantitative. however, in 
psychology this is not always strictly required, and many scales are in fact 
used (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio), at the cost of losing progressively 
certain properties: passing from the nominal scale to the ratio scale, one 
passes from a purely qualitative measure to a fully quantitative measure, and 
gains identity, order, quantity, and absolute value, as well as an increasing 
number of allowed mathematical and statistical treatments of the variable. 
clearly, more stringent positions exist, and according to lord Kelvin, “When 
you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, 
you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the 
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced 
to the state of science”. a similar view was expressed by the Pythagorean-
style thorndike’s motto “whatever exists at all exists in some amount”. With 
our particular data analysis there is no need that the points along the roc 
curve are equally spaced, thus there is no need that the raw visibility ratings 
represent necessarily an interval or ratio scale, which is always a questionable 
assumption. in fact, by using the roc curve we could build a fully quantitative 
index out of an ordinal variable, without assuming that observers are capable 
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of translating faithfully a conscious sensation into a number.
figure 1. left, the visual motion stimuli (rdK) with three different coherences. 
in the actual experiment, we used only the threshold coherence and the zero 
coherence; also, all moving dots had the same color. The stimuli were briefly 
displayed for 200 ms. right, motion perception performance under different 
conditions, expressed in the same metrics (d’). The insets indicate the statistical 
significances. Bars represent the standard deviation.
Figure 1b illustrates the main results of the experiment. all relevant 
differences can be appreciated: discrimination is superior to detection, 
when assessed with a 2-intervals trial design (p=0.007). despite being a 
somewhat counterintuitive result, this is not a fully unexpected effect, 
its magnitude depending on the relation between the sensory attributes 
used for detecting or discriminating a stimulus (Wickens, 2002). the yet 
non-significant superiority of 2-Int detection compared to 1-Int detection 
is also expected, and depends on the additional information provided by 
two stimuli, compared to one stimulus (azzopardi&cowey, 1997). Finally, 
the lowest performance was observed in the rating task, in which d’ was 
significantly lower than in the yes/no task (p=0.048).
Why d’ was so low in the rating task? We argue that it is because this task 
implies a fully conscious judgment, whereas a simple 1-int detection task, 
and even more so the 2-int detection task, can be executed automatically 
or almost automatically (for example with less attention), especially 
with simple and repetitive stimulus presentations in the laboratory. 
this implies that an observer can detect the motion stimulus even when 
it is subjectively invisible, as also suggested by a large body of data on 
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unconscious perception (merikle et al., 2001). consider also that monkeys 
can be trained to perform a sort of yes/no task (the so-called commentary 
key method, cowey and Stoerig, 1997), but it is doubtful that they can be 
trained with a complex rating task. obviously, these considerations do not 
imply that human observers perform detection tasks always automatically, 
or that monkeys are phenomenally blind; they just indicate that a rating 
task for subjective visibility is more likely to tag visual consciousness than 
other detection tasks. thus, the perceptual performance, be it detection or 
discrimination, can be higher than expected on the basis of the reported 
subjective motion visibility. this, in turn, strengthens our proposal that, 
at least under uncertainty conditions, conscious perception lags visuo-
motor responses and perceptual decisions (de’Sperati and baud-bovy, 2008; 
gregori-grgic et al., 2011). in other words, perceptual decisions can be taken 
before the observer achieves full conscious appreciation of the stimulus.
even though our proposal of transforming the subjective visibility ratings 
into a measure of perceptual decision seems to be a useful link between 
first-person and third-person aspects of perception, the first step of our 
procedure, namely, the very assessment of the subjective sensation itself, 
may not be totally undisputed. despite the careful instructions to the 
subjects, the mainstream, orthodox Gestaltist might not be satisfied using a 
scale to describe a subjective sensation. he might object that the procedure 
is still somewhat constrained, that the conscious subjective experience 
cannot be reduced to a simple score, and that the relation between the 
scores and “true” visibility would be anyway largely arbitrary, so that the 
idea that a scale captures the conscious experience is something closer to 
wishful thinking than to a granted fact. indeed, this is not exactly what the 
gestalt phenomenological tradition hoped to get, that is, “as naïf and full 
a description of direct experience as possible” (Koffka 1935): after all, the 
perceptual judgments that we asked to our participants were neither truly 
“naïf” nor “full”. 
but even the mainstream, orthodox psychophysicist might not be fully 
satisfied either, although for different reasons. He would claim that a rating 
scale is not enough objective, and would prefer to use quantities derived 
from more constrained procedures involving for example forced-choice 
responses. Fechner himself – but not Stevens – did not believe that subjects 
could directly judge the quantitative structure of their sensations (michell, 
1999, 82). Some recent proposals also addressed the hard problem to combine 
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the objectivity of a measure of perceptual decision with the subjectivity 
of individual experience, but without assessing directly the perceptual 
sensation. Post-decision wagering (Persaud et al., 2007), as well as the simpler 
method of confidence rating (Kunimoto et al., 2001), involves subjects taking 
a decision about a given stimulus attribute (e.g., rightward or leftward 
motion), and then placing a bet on their own decision, or simply giving a 
confidence rating. By properly combining the decision and the wagering/
confidence responses, it is presumed to construct a reliable measure of 
the conscious experience of the stimulus that originated the decision. 
the title of the original paper is instructive in this regard (Post-decision 
wagering objectively measures awareness; but see evans and azzopardi, 2007 
and Sandberg et al., 2010 for less optimist views). here too, and perhaps even 
more convincingly than in a simpler rating task for visibility as the one we 
have used, automatic evaluation can be excluded, and conscious judgment 
implied. however, whereas adding metacognition to a perceptual task would 
grant the involvement of consciousness, it would at the same time tax the 
procedure with extraneous elements (in the case of confidence rating or 
post-decision wagering it is the estimation of the confidence of an internal 
decision, not of stimulus visibility). Unfortunately, where exactly drawing 
the line between a simple conscious sensation – something to be preserved – 
and additional metacognitive processing – something to be excluded – is not 
at all obvious. as a matter of fact, the act itself of reporting, even in the most 
natural way, a conscious sensation is already adding an extra-load. although 
no single measure of consciousness (but not even verbal descriptions) escape 
this rule, we believe our rating of subjective visibility is closer to the raw 
subjective sensation than any measure of perceptual decisions, whether or 
not combined by a self-evaluation of the decision reliability.
a few years ago vittorio gallese maintained that we should 
“phenomenologize cognitive neuroscience rather than naturalize 
phenomenology” (gallese 2006, 294). in this vein, our attempt may 
be regarded as a first step towards the “phenomenologization of 
psychophysics” (Kubovy&gepshtein, 2003). Probably, the orthodox gestaltist 
would continue to assert the primacy of the phenomenological analysis, 
while the orthodox psychophysicist would probably continue to prefer more 
objective procedures. We have no answers to convince orthodox believers, 
but we hope at least to have offered some arguments to heterodox agnostics. 
clearly, our proposal lays entirely within the psychophysical tradition, but 
the line is drawn close to the subjective side of perception. in doing this, we 
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have merged the spirit of subjective direct scaling (magnitude estimation, 
Stevens, 1957), with the spirit of objective decision-making (Sdt, Wickens 
2002). While there is no doubt that the richness and the structure of our 
conscious visual experience goes well beyond a measure of the level of a 
single quantitative attribute, we think it is important to try to go at the 
heart of conscious experience itself, which we have identified as subjective 
visibility. Focusing on the very origin of the conscious sensation (the “first 
half second” in the microgenesis of perception, ogmen and breitmeyer, 
2006) may be a unique opportunity, if not a requirement, to understand how 
visual consciousness emerges out of sensory-motor mechanisms.
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